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[p. 31]  
 
I. Introduction 
Imagine the following example. A woman has a job interview and is turned down because ulti-
mately the employer prefers a man for the position. The woman goes to court to seek justice. 
The court in fact does allow the woman’s claim because there is a substantive rule of equal op-
portunity in private law forbidding gender discrimination in employment contracts. According to 
the private law system that the court had to apply, the appropriate remedy is compensation for 
damage. However, as there was no contract between the woman and the employer, in effect the 
pecuniary damage that the woman suffered were the travel expenses she made in order to get to 
the job interview. That was all she got compensated for. 
This is a silly example of a case in which the substantive rule, which aimed at preventing gender 
discrimination, was defeated by an inefficacious enforcement instrument. It is obvious that if pri-
vate law rules aim at preventing a wrong, then the remedy should at least aspire to have a pre-
ventive effect. So, this example sounds like a bad joke about lawyers. In fact, the joke gets worse.  
Consider the following three less straightforward examples. 
An employee of a nursing care home for the elderly walks down a narrow corridor. Alongside the 
corridor are a number of doors which open into the corridor. These doors are quite wide and if 
you open them too quickly they swing out into the corridor. This creates an obvious risk of physi-
cal injury to anyone who happens to be passing. 
Indeed, the employee is struck in the face and she suffers injuries. She goes to court for several 
reasons, the most important one being that she wants to get compensated for the loss. But she 
also wants to send out a signal to the employer that he should do something about the danger-
ous situation so that others will not be hurt. The employee files for compensation and is indeed 
granted compensation. The court agrees with the employee that the combination of the narrow 
corridor and the wide doors opening into it is unacceptably dangerous and that the employer 
should have prevented the accident from happening.  
 A second example. A doctor is obliged to inform the patient of the inherent risks of the treat-
ment. If the doctor fails to inform the patient, it constitutes a breach of a contractual information 
duty. Breach of this duty  is remedied by the right to compensation of the damage suffered by 
consenting to the treatment without having all the relevant information. However, if the patient 
suffers from the inherent risk of the treatment, then the question is: would the patient have con-
sented to the treatment [p. 32]  if he had in fact been given all relevant information. So, if the 
patient’s decision would not have been different if the information had been given or if the pa-
tient cannot prove it would have made a drastically different decision, the breach of the duty to 
inform did not cause any harm. So in effect, the law says: yes, there is a wrongful omission by the 
doctor, but no, there is no damage, and that’s where civil remedies stop. 
Finally, a short third example. Clients of a bank were all brought to detriment by a computer pro-
gram that allowed the bank to round off some electronic payments. Each client of the bank suf-
fered a small damage, a mere few Euro’s per annum. The bank, however,  gained millions of Eu-
ros by this process. The bank was in breach of a contractual duty to the clients, but the clients did 
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not bother to instigate claims for compensation, because the cost in legal fees, time and energy 
weighed too heavily on each of them. 
These examples are typical of the lack of efficacious enforcement that sometimes occurs in con-
tract law and tort law.  What is meant by lack of efficacious enforcement? 
Substantive rules have one or more goals. Theoretically speaking, these goals are supposed to be 
reached by means of compliance with the rule. Compliance in turn is served by instruments of 
enforcement, either remedies in private law or sanctions in public law. To serve the goals set by 
the substantive rule, remedies and sanctions must have the capacity to produce the desired ef-
fect. So, in theory remedies in contract and tort can be evaluated – just as much as sanctions in 
public law – on the basis of their efficacy, their capacity to serve the goals of the underlying rules, 
to prevent infringement of rights and wrongfulness generally. 
From time to time legislators, courts, and legal doctrine should address the question of whether 
the substantive rules of contract and tort law as such are still served by the instruments of en-
forcement. And if not, then perhaps we should look for alternative instruments. Evaluation of the 
status quo may learn that alternative remedies and sanctions or alternative designs could reach 
the goals set by the rule more efficaciously.   
At this point, you may ask for a yardstick. How do we measure efficacy in prevention? Admitted-
ly, this can be problematic. First, we would need to know the goal of rules. This is not always 
easy. Ask ten scholars what the aim is of the right to terminate a contract after breach of the con-
tract. You will probably end up with more than ten possible answers and less than one straight 
answer.  
So, sometimes we have to make assumptions about the goals of a specific rule. My general as-
sumption here is that rules in private law have discernable objectives which cannot merely be of 
a corrective nature.  Correctiveness by definition implies making right the wrong after it has hap-
pened; correctiveness is by definition backward looking . Surely, there must be more to private 
law than just looking back.  
My simplistic approach to private law  is that most rules are made with a distinction in mind – 
sometimes made explicit and sometimes left implicit – between right behaviour and wrong be-
haviour. What is considered right should be encouraged and [p. 33]  what is wrong should be 
discouraged. So, in the end the rules of contract law and tort law are about behaviour and how to 
give incentives for the right behaviour and how to prevent undesirable behaviour.1  
Assuming that this approach is in essence correct, what then do we know about the efficacy of 
the remedy with regard to the encouragement and discouragement? In my view, the yardstick by 
which to measure a remedy is whether and to what extent it adds to compliance with the sub-
stantive rule.  
My proposition is that  the remedies of private law seem outdated when it comes to enforcing 
compliance by – in particular – corporate wrongdoers. Roughly speaking the remedies usually 
employed in private law systems are the following: 
 
o Nullification of the contract that was concluded under material influence of mistake, duress 
or undue influence; 
o Withdrawal from the contract in case of non-performance; 
o Compensation for damage suffered as a consequence of imputable non-performance of the 
contract; 
o Compensation for imputable wrongful acts and omissions suffered outside contract. 
 
                                                        
1 I refer to W.H. van Boom, Efficacious Enforcement in Contract and Tort , The Hague: BJU 2006, for further references and extension 
of the arguments.  
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Although there is little empirical evidence regarding the efficacy of these remedies, there are 
some impressions from studying the law in action that we need to focus on.  
 
II. Three features of private law remedies 
These impressions lead us to three prominent features of the law of remedies. 
First, there is the ex post feature. Private law remedies focus on remedying a wrong that has al-
ready materialized. The underlying presumption may well be that by thus enforcing the substan-
tive rule, justice is done to the party invoking the remedy and in the process his detrimental posi-
tion  is more or less put right. As a result, the ex post feature seems to indicate that the law is 
more concerned with putting right the wrong rather than actually preventing the wrong.  
The second feature is the restoration feature. By focussing on putting right the wrong, the law 
tries to put the injured party as much as possible in the position that he would have been in, had 
the wrong not been committed. This perspective has led to an ever more refined system aimed at 
virtually turning back the clock: by reinstating property rights with retroactive effect, by giving 
claims for restoration, by repairing the defective goods, and by compensating lost profits and 
other future benefits that would have accrued if the breach of contract or the tort had not been 
committed. The claimant is entitled to be brought in the position in which he would have been 
but for the wrong. The mirror image is that the other party will not have to restore more [p. 34]  
than what was lost: the restoration feature in principle does not allow either a duty to pay puni-
tive damages or a duty to disgorge corporate profits obtained from the wrong. 
The third feature is the specificity feature. Private law remedies are aimed at providing redress in 
a specific case, to a specific claimant, fitted to his purposes, to do justice to his case and the fac-
tual circumstances that regard him. Courts obviously consider it to be their task to adjudicate 
rights and duties to the parties present in the procedure instead of delivering broadly phrased 
decisions that may surpass the interests implicated in the procedure. Specificity in principle im-
plies that enforcement is dependent on private parties instigating claims. 
There is good reason for focussing on the three features of ex post, restoration and specificity: in 
certain cases they seem to constitute a major impediment to efficacious enforcement of private 
law.  
First, remember the example of the narrow corridor and the wide doors. It is an example of the 
ex post feature combined with the ownership of the problem.  
The idea of ownership of a problem alludes to a specific consequence of the private law paradigm 
of autonomy, namely that where individuals do not feel the urge or lack the resources to go to 
court and exercise their private rights, there is no private enforcement either. In some parts of 
private law this seems to strongly amplify the ex post feature. For instance, tortious liability for 
accidental death and injury seems very much based on the ex post feature. Victims usually do not 
own the problem until after the risk materializes and strikes them. Potential victims rely on man-
ufacturers to carefully contemplate the design and production of the product, on employers to 
contemplate the safety of the working process, and on owners of premises to ensure safety of 
the structure. Only after wrongful omission of the manufacturer, employer or owner has in fact 
caused injury, will private law concern itself with the question whether the injury should have 
been prevented.  
And even after the event, in legal terms the victim cannot be said to be concerned with prevent-
ing the accident from happening again: in legal terms, his concern is the compensation of his own 
injuries. This may seem obvious to the legal practitioner, but it is not to the lay man. Research 
shows that the motives of people going to court are not exclusively financial: they typically also 
want to ensure that others will not suffer from a similar future event.  
There are several objections that can be raised against the ex post feature.  
In short, the ex post feature concentrates on restoring after the event, not on installing safe-
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guards to prevent the accident from happening again. This flies in the face of the goal of preven-
tion. First, it may not adequately satisfy the needs of those motivated to use contract and tort 
remedies with specific deterrence objectives in mind.  
Second, the ex post feature hardly ever focuses on monitoring behaviour after the court decision. 
In essence, court decisions tend to be financially oriented. Therefore, the risk itself may material-
ize again if the ex post feature is employed. Whether or not [p. 35]   it actually will, depends, in-
ter alia, on the deterrence value of the ex post compensation in the specific case.  
The employee claiming damages from her employer, the court stating that the employer was 
wrong and should have prevented the accident, all started from the idea that the accident should 
never have happened. But who makes sure that it will in fact never happen again?  
Third, the longer the lapse of time between the wrong and the remedy, the weaker the preven-
tive effect will be. This dilution of incentives as a result of long latency is a well-known  problem-
atic issue: corporate policy may have evolved after the wrong, scientific or social insights may 
already have changed over time, et cetera.   
Furthermore, the ex post feature combined with vague standards of substantive law rather than 
clear cut rules may cause uncertainty ex ante with regard to the appropriate line of behaviour. 
This uncertainty may play in the hands of unnecessary defensive behaviour. 
To conclude, the ex post feature may not be efficacious in reaching the goals of the substantive 
rule. It may lack specific deterrence value if the court decision is not followed by some monitor-
ing activity, it may lack general deterrence value in cases of long latency, and it may fuel ineffi-
cient defensiveness.  
Another potential obstacle to efficacious enforcement of a more fundamental nature seems to 
be an inherent trait of many legal systems: the law of damages.  
Remember the patient that was wronged by the physician who did not disclose material infor-
mation about the risks of the treatment. There was no claim for compensation because the pa-
tient would not have decided otherwise.  It is an example of the problem of causation and the 
restoration feature. 
Restoration presupposes proof that something has in fact been lost. In this respect the causation 
requirement is known to be a serious threshold for any claimant to succeed in claiming. There are 
good reasons for this threshold. The causation requirement as such is the legal fence between 
compensation of the truly injured and overcompensation of the randomly selected.  
However, in practice, where science increasingly shows correlative relationships between agent 
and effect, the law usually sticks to concrete chains of causation – it asks itself the question 
whether in this concrete case the causation is more probable than not. Originally, most legal sys-
tems do not consider a 33 percent increased risk of cancer due to some toxic agent to be a head 
of damage in its own right. However, the good news is that an increasing number of legal sys-
tems  opened the possibility of claiming a proportionate part of damage that can never be 
proved to be (solely) caused by a specific agent.  
The battle over acknowledgement of increased risks of damage and loss of a chance as heads of 
damage in their own right is ongoing. The focal point here is that in [p. 36]  principle compensa-
tion is only available to those who can prove damage and causation in their specific case. That 
feature is worthwhile in theory, but in practice it may leave deserving cases – in which damage 
and causation are plausible on a statistical level but hard to substantiate in a concrete case – 
without remedy. Leaving deserving claimants without compensation as a consequence of obsta-
cles in substantive or procedural rules may give rise to a state of inefficacy.  
There are several objections that can be raised against the restoration feature. As long as civil 
courts cherish the connectedness of enforcement and restoration, some loopholes in enforce-
ment may never be properly addressed. First, there are the cases in which the damage require-
ment and the causation requirement oust deserving claims.  
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Second, if restoration is to be an instrument of efficacious prevention of wrongs, then we should 
consider using disgorgement of profits more intensely than has been the case until now. The reti-
cence to allow disgorgement of profits seems to stem from the classical approach to restoration: 
nothing more and nothing less than the claimant’s loss. Efficacy may demand, however, that we 
shift the focus to the preventive goals of private law rules rather than the mere compensatory 
function. 
Third, rudimentary standards on how to assess the right amount of damage are beautiful in a 
dogmatic sense, but in a practical sense they may turn out to be inefficacious. Parties negotiating 
a settlement may have little concrete rules to fall back on, which may increase the cost of reach-
ing a settlement. Furthermore, without clear cut rules on calculation of damages, one-shot play-
ers may suffer from serious lack of information and settle for less than the substantive rule may 
have to offer. Moreover, the consequence of flexible and open textured private law values with 
regard to, for instance ,  calculating damages, may well be that repeat players strategically pro-
tract settlement. In this respect, the uninformed individual may be better of with clear-cut rules 
rather than with open textured standards.  
Now, remember the third example, where clients of the bank did not bother to instigate individ-
ual claims in court. This is an example of trifle damage combined with the specificity feature. 
Whenever a wrong – either in contract or in tort – gives rise to a dispersal of detriment to a great 
number of individuals that are individually endowed with individual but uneconomically viable 
claims, the specificity feature may lead to a complete lack of enforcement of the underlying pri-
vate law values. 
What causes this state of affairs is the specificity feature which encourages potential claimants to 
show ‘rational apathy’. The possible benefits of claiming in case of trifles are outweighed by the 
cost in terms of time, energy, and legal costs. Not claiming then seems the rational thing to do. 
The result may be that substantive rules of private law are not enforced at all by individuals, turn-
ing enforcement into what economists would consider a ‘public good’.  
[p. 37]  There are several objections that can be raised against the specificity feature.  
Specificity relies on specific claimants to instigate a claim. The net effect of these individual 
claims on corporate behaviour may be substantial, but may also turn out to be insignificant. Im-
agine for instance a chain of retailers using onerous general clauses. If a specific consumer is 
faced with these clauses he may successfully contest the fact that the clauses are at all invokable. 
However, that is just one consumer. Others may not challenge the small print, and the one who 
does will not request an injunction forbidding the seller to use similar clauses in future transac-
tions with other consumers. As a result, the onerous clauses may remain in circulation, thus sus-
taining illicit practices with regard to other, less-informed or less-persistent consumers. This is 
unique to the specificity feature: the individual may have been helped, but society as a whole is 
left untouched. A more efficacious instrument of enforcement of the underlying private law val-
ues – although not necessarily a perfect one – would be a procedure facilitating and monitoring 
forced erasure of the clauses altogether.  
In short, it can be argued that specificity tends to ignore the bigger picture and may thus be 
merely fighting symptoms rather than curing the disease.  
 
III. Inefficacy 
So, what do we have so far? We have introduced three basic features of contract and tort and we 
have seen that sometimes they can be an obstacle for efficacy. Although this point would need 
further research, I suggest that we work from the assumption that inefficacy arises as soon as : 
 
1) there are strong indications that the goals of the substantive rule are not met by the available 
and commonly applied remedies and  
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2) enforcement of the rule is hampered by any of the following three reasons: 
 
o The ex post feature may result in too much or too little precaution to prevent wrongs 
o The restoration feature presents obstacles to a deserving class of claimants and as a re-
sult claims are typically not brought to court 
o The specificity feature may constitute an obstacle to preventing trifle damage 
 
The next question is: what can be done to improve efficacy? 
In economic theory some of the problems we have identified so far, are in some respects con-
nected to the phenomenon of ‘public goods’. Theory holds that public goods need to be generat-
ed by public law and some kind of public enforcement. And indeed, all three examples presented 
 seem to be the subject of some sort of public law regulation.  
Occupational health and safety agencies, food safety agencies, local authority supervisors on 
building activity, competition authorities, equal treatment boards, health care quality boards, you 
name it, public law has it. Public law uses regulatory permits, [p. 38]  criminal prosecution, disci-
plinary boards, administrative penalties, forced closure of business, and depriving professional 
license.  
So, there are myriad public enforcement efforts to regulate corporate behaviour with similar 
goals as private law institutions. Essentially, we should ask ourselves: Who needs private law an-
ymore?  
Obviously, this question does not need an answer. The arguments in favour of combined public 
and private enforcement efforts are easily articulated. Public enforcement agencies lack infor-
mation, have limited resources, need to prioritise and therefore cannot enforce all rules with 
similar efficacy; agencies may or may not maximize enforcement efforts; they may suffer from 
‘agency capture’; the public law rules are inflexible as opposed to private law standards. Moreo-
ver, a lot of problems are not subject to public law regulation, leaving enforcement entirely to 
private law standards and initiatives.  
 
IV. Innovating private law 
So, there is much to be said in defence of private law. Against the background of a growing num-
ber of public authorities assigned with the duty to monitor and enforce compliance, we should 
not doubt the relevance of private law but ask ourselves how we can achieve innovation in order 
to rediscover the balance between private law and public law.  
So, private law remedies should be innovated. Before turning to the ‘how’, let us not forget that a 
lot of innovation has already been going on over the last decades. Unfortunately, most of these 
innovations concerned the law of damages. This is unfortunate because it proves that the focus 
of private law enforcement is on the compensatory function of private law remedies while ne-
glecting the improvement of remedies that can provide possibly more efficacious incentives for 
compliance with the underlying substantive rules.  
Therefore, if we are to build on what has already been achieved in this respect we should seri-
ously ask whether further improving or intensifying individual damages actions really adds to the 
preventive goals of the underlying substantive rules. Damages actions will probably continue to 
carry the burden of the ex post feature, the restoration feature and the specificity feature. 
Instead, I feel that the focus of attention for the coming years should be on innovating other 
remedies than individual compensatory damages actions. In my opinion, three possible routes to 
innovation deserve further attention.  
In the first place, the use of ex post incentive payments. In the second place, we should consider 
how to enhance collective action by interest groups. And finally, we should consider whether we 
can turn a number of cases under the ex post feature into an ex ante feature. 
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[p. 39]  Given the limited space available, I will not discuss the concept of collective interest 
group action but instead focus on ex post incentive payments and ex ante prevention.  
First, the ex post incentive payments.  
In Europe, use of the concept of exemplary or punitive damages is not widespread. Instead, the 
remedy of damages is said not to be of a punitive nature but of a compensatory nature. There 
are some indications, however, that a modest shift in paradigm is underway. If we define punitive 
damages as some form of ex post incentive payments exceeding the actual pecuniary loss and 
aimed at specific deterrence, then the moderated idea of punitive damages could perhaps fit bet-
ter into European legal culture. This concept of ex post incentive payments seems worth further 
consideration. 
Naturally, the drawbacks of punitive damages in the U.S.A. are well documented. The empirical 
evidence for all these drawbacks, however, originate from a legal system that is in many ways 
different from the European legal systems. If we truly want to know whether some form of pan-
European ex post incentive for prevention has potential for efficacy, then perhaps specific exper-
iments within the European legal context should be performed in order to generate data which 
are more relevant to Europe.  
Obviously, there are practical obstacles that stand in the way of such an experiment, but I do feel 
that it would be worth trying with regard to specific areas. 
Important conditions that could keep such an ‘experiment’ orderly are the following.  
First, ex post incentive payments would have to be limited to breach of clear-cut statutory duties 
and repetitive non-compliance with previous civil court decisions.  Second, the lapse of time be-
tween the commission of the wrong and the award  should be limited. Both restrictions would 
help preventing inefficacious side effects such as overdetterence. Third, the amounts would have 
to be either limited or set according to an objective standard. Fourth, the legislature would have 
to decide on whether these damages may be claimed by individual claimants or merely by inter-
est group actions and to whom the proceeds would accrue. Finally, the idea would have to be 
limited to areas in which public enforcement efforts are below an optimal level. 
A further point that seems worth considering here, is the disgorgement of corporate profits. In 
my opinion, there is a strong relationship between the concept of ex post incentive damages and 
the idea that wrongfully obtained profits should be disgorged. Admittedly, this is an idea that is 
not central to European legal systems, although there are specific statutory provisions allowing 
disgorgement.  
In my view, for similar reasons stated with regard to ex post incentive damages, the idea of dis-
gorgement should be considered, both from a corrective point of view and from a deterrence 
point of view. Especially in areas where the calculation of damages is difficult but detriment as 
such is nevertheless likely. 
[p. 40]  The final and most promising route to explore is the route of turning the ex post feature 
into an ex ante feature. 
It has been argued that clear-cut rules are better at modifying behaviour than open textured 
standards. If this holds true, both contract law and tort law can hardly be considered to be effica-
cious in reaching behaviour modification given the ex post, restoration, and specificity features. 
Therefore, turning abstract contract and tort standards into concrete rules by shifting these fea-
tures into an effective ex ante instrument of behaviour modification may indeed add to efficacy 
of private law. 
Naturally, this abstract notion needs further elaboration. Furthermore, it is obvious that it cannot 
be considered to be a solution to all enforcement problems in private law. In the framework of 
this paper I will limit myself to some general observations.  
Consider an investment ‘product’ involving considerable inherent financial risks being marketed 
on the consumer market. After widespread sales of this contract the stock exchange plummets 
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and the risk materializes. A civil court then reaches the conclusion that this ‘product’ has in fact a 
design defect in the sense that the advertising and marketing strategy employed by the invest-
ment bank in fact neglected the duty under contract law standards to properly warn consumers 
of the inherent risks of the ‘product’.  Under the ex post feature the civil court rules that the fi-
nancial contracts are void or voidable, forcing all parties involved to apply the restoration and 
specificity features. Other courts go over the same individual process. This is laborious and ineffi-
cacious. 
Now consider the alternative, where the investment bank turns to the civil court before or soon 
after marketing the product, or is implied in a request to the court submitted by a consumer as-
sociation to ascertain in an abstract sense the validity of the financial contract under private law 
standards of disclosure and voidability. Certainty on the validity of the financial product as such 
at an early stage – as a result of the ‘advance determination’ by means of the declaratory judge-
ment – could certainly be a more efficacious remedy. Theoretically speaking, it resembles the 
abstract evaluation of general contract clauses available in some legal systems. Practically speak-
ing we must ensure that it is more successful than that example. 
Furthermore, consider a workplace where intensive use is made of noxious substances which are 
not subject to public regulation but which are known by specialized personnel to be harmful to 
employees exposed to these substances. Due to long latency some years onwards claims for 
compensation may arise. By that time statutory duties have been designed, company policy has 
changed and compensation will not serve any prevention goals. 
Now consider a civil court procedure in which a labour union seeks prohibitory injunctive relief 
for the benefit of the exposed employees at an early stage and on the basis of negligence based 
standards of private law. 
[p. 41]  If courts could be called upon to decide at an early stage, and thus give guidance to the 
conduct of the parties involved, the underlying private law standards in these cases could be 
turned into clear-cut rules for corporate behaviour at a very early stage. By doing so, the ex post 
feature could be traded in for an ex ante instrument of more efficacious enforcement. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
Clearly, this sketchy outline needs further thinking. Nevertheless I do believe that the ex ante ap-
proach may combine the strong points of private law – flexibility, open texture standards, and 
generality – with a higher degree of legal certainty at an early stage. By clearing up possible un-
certainties about the law beforehand and thus providing more clarity on the required corporate 
behaviour the degree of compliance may increase.  
The previous implies that civil courts would need to take a different approach towards injunc-
tions and declaratory judgements.  Prohibitory and mandatory injunctive relief are not as wide-
spread and generally applicable in all European jurisdictions as would be necessary for the pur-
poses dealt with here. Furthermore, whereas civil courts are reticent in rendering broadly appli-
cable declaratory judgements, they would need to carefully consider the extent of their decision.  
There is also the practical point of monitoring. Injunctive relief is by no means a guarantee that 
the court decision will be complied with voluntarily. So who will monitor the implementation of 
the court decision? Full monitoring by private or public agents will be too expensive and ineffi-
cient. Therefore, incentives have to be built into civil procedure for voluntary compliance by the 
respondent and some level of monitoring by the claimant at the same time.  
There are several instruments in the various jurisdictions that can help in this respect. Legisla-
tures could start by introducing a serious system of penalty payments ancillary to injunctive re-
lief.  
Clearly, all this would assign a more central role to civil courts. That brings me to a more general 
point: the future of civil courts. Undeniably, civil courts have always been at the core of enforce-
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ment, but they do show inherent restraints.  
Courts lack important information on other cases and on the effects of their judgements on third 
parties. Civil courts are not specialised in particular fields of the law but instead they are 
equipped to judge individual cases of varying nature. Courts cannot choose the cases that are put 
to them (although most jurisdictions do have some sort of mechanism to refuse unimportant 
cases). Courts are relatively immune to political agendas and pressures. Conversely, most civil 
courts have not been not set up to shift between policy goals and to prioritise. Moreover, courts 
do not have a feedback system that allows them to respond to  calls from society; this is worrying 
in the sense [p. 42]  that contract law and tort law are operationalised largely through court deci-
sions but there is no institutional mechanism for measuring efficacy  and ‘client satisfaction’.  
These restraints seem to play in the hands of those in favour of specialised agencies that can use 
sophisticated instruments of enforcement. Nevertheless, in a sense civil courts have been and 
will always be ‘enforcement officers’. In the years to come they will be increasingly challenged to 
manage claims rather than merely adjudicate rights and duties. 
One specific area where courts will be increasingly at the centre of enforcement, is in the manag-
ing of mass claims. For this purpose, some European jurisdictions have either recently devised or 
are currently considering specific procedural rules on court-managed settlement of mass (injury) 
claims. This will challenge civil courts to take a more active role in managing complicated litiga-
tion, be it multi-party damage litigation, injunctive relief for the benefit of numerous people, or 
declaratory judgements in an ex ante procedure.  
On a more general level, civil courts should embrace the challenge to take a more active role in 
enforcing the substantive rules of private law. In this sense courts should consider their task in 
private law to be not merely the specific adjudication of rights and duties after wrongdoing, but 
also the more general task of providing more specific guidelines to potential claimants and re-
spondents on how to act and how not to act to prevent wrongdoing.   
Perhaps then we would know whether the wide doors in the narrow corridor were indeed re-
moved or adjusted. Perhaps then the hospital where the physician worked that did not bother to 
obtain informed consent, would be forced to monitor physician behaviour and report after a 
fixed period about the incidence rate and how it dropped. Perhaps then we would see that the 
bank that skimmed cents from their clients’ accounts is forced to disgorge profits into a public 
fund.  
Naturally, it would be too radical a step to suggest that the ex post, restoration and specificity 
features should be outright abandoned. However, I do think that some modifications or alterna-
tive approaches are in order. My position is that private law can do better in achieving its goals 
and in preventing wrongs. Private law is not just about designing fair rules for society, it is also 
about daring to innovate and experiment with enforcement instruments.  
The routes I just sketched are there to be discovered, not merely by academics but by legislative 
bodies as well. Although the concept of experimental legislation seems to be unfamiliar to pri-
vate law legislatures, I feel that the efficacy of the routes suggested here can only be truly meas-
ured by putting them into practice and evaluating the results. After all, through experiment 
comes innovation. We need more understanding of the possible effects; evaluation will help de-
sign lasting solutions. 
 
